Against the Sicilian Expedition

Nicias (d. 413 B.C.)

(414 B.C.)

As a general, successful against the Spartans; the peace of 421 B.C. named after him; one of the commanders of the expedition against Sicily which he had strongly opposed; won several battles, but was defeated in 413 and put to death.



THIS assembly was, it is true, convened to consider the subject of our preparations, namely, in what way we ought to make the expedition to Sicily. My opinion, however, is, that we ought still to consider this very point, whether it be better to send out our ships; and not on such slight deliberation on matters of great moment, at the instigation of aliens, to take upon ourselves a war with which we have nothing to do. And yet I, for my own part, receive honor from such a policy, and have less fear than others for my own personal safety (though I consider that man to be an equally good citizen who takes some forethought both for his person and his property; for such a man would, for his own sake, be most desirous that his country also should prosper); nevertheless, neither aforetime have I ever spoken contrary to my convictions, for the sake of being honored above others, nor will I now, but as I think best, so will I speak. And though your inclinations my words would be powerless, should I advise you to keep what you have, and not expose your present possessions to danger for things which are uncertain and future; yet that neither are you timely in your haste, nor the objects of your ambition easy to attain, on these points I will give you instruction.

I say then, that you wish, though leaving many enemies behind you here, to bring hither fresh ones besides, by sailing there. And you fancy, perhaps, that the treaty that has been made by you affords some round of confidence. But though as long as you remain quiet, that will, indeed, be a treaty—in name (for this condition have certain persons here and among your enemies brought it by their intrigues), yet if we are ever defeated with any considerable force, those who hate us will quickly make an attack upon us; seeing, in the first place, that the arrangement was made of necessity by them, under circumstances of disaster, and of greater discredit to them than to us; and, secondly, that in this very arrangement we have many subjects open to debate. There are some, too, who have not yet acceded even to this composition, such as it is, and those not the least powerful states; but some of them are at war with us downright, and, in the case of others, because the Lacedæmonians remain quiet at present, they too are restrained by truces from one ten days to another. But probably, if they should find our power divided (which we are now so anxious to bring about), they would with all their might attack us, in conjunction with the Siceliots, whose alliance they would in time past have valued most highly.

Every one therefore ought to look to this, and not presume to run risks with a state so unsettled, and to grasp at another empire before we have secured the one we have; seeing that the Chalcidians Thraceward, though they have revolted from us so many years, are still unsubdued; and there are some others on the different coasts of the mainland who yield us but a doubtful obedience. And so we are quick to succor the Segestans, who are our allies, forsooth, as being injured; but on those by whose revolt we have ourselves long ago been injured, we still defer to avenge ourselves.

And yet the latter, if subdued, might be kept in subjection by us; but the former, even if we conquered them, we should hardly be able to govern, so far off and so numerous as they are. But it is folly to go against men whom we could not keep under, if we conquered them; while, if we did not succeed in the attempt, we should not be in the same position as we were before making it. Again, regarding the present condition of the Siceliots, they appear to me even still less likely to be formidable to us, if the Syracusans should have dominion over them; that supposition with which the Segestans especially try to frighten us. For at present they might, perhaps, come hither as separate states, to oblige the Lacedæmonians; but in the other case, it is not likely that they should undertake the expedition, empire against empire; for in the same manner as they, in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians, had taken away ours, it is probable that they would have their own taken away by the same Peloponnesians, and by the same principle.

And the Greeks in those parts would be most in awe of us, if we did not go there at all; and next to that, if after making a demonstration of our power we retired in a short time; but if we should meet with any reverse, they would very quickly despise us, and attack us in concert with our enemies here. For we all know that what is farthest off is most admired, and what gives the least room for having its fame tested. And this has at present been your case, Athenians, with reference to the Lacedæmonians and their allies; from having, contrary to your expectation, gained the advantage over them (comparing your present position with the fears you at first entertained), you have despised them, and are now desiring the conquest of Sicily. You ought not, however, to be elated through the misfortunes of your adversaries, but then only to feel confident when you have mastered their spirits; nor should you think that the Lacedæmonians are doing aught but considering, in consequence of their disgrace, in what way they may even now, if possible, overthrow us, and bring their own discredit to a happy termination; especially as they have studied a reputation for bravery, as a thing of the greatest importance, and for the greatest length of time. So that our great struggle will be, if we are wise, not for the Segestans in Sicily, men who are barbarians, but that we may vigorously guard against a state which is plotting against us by the spread of oligarchical principles.

I am alarmed, indeed, when I see such characters sitting here at present by the side of that same individual, in compliance with his bidding; and in return I bid the older men—whichever of them may have one of those characters sitting by him—not to be put down through shame, in order to avoid being thought a coward if he should not vote for going to war; nor, as their opponents themselves might feel, to be madly enamored of what they do not possess; being convinced that in very few things do men succeed through desire, but in very many through forethought; but in behalf of their country, as exposing itself to the greatest danger it has ever done, to give their support to the opposite side, and vote that the Siceliots keep the same boundaries with respect to us as at present—boundaries with which no one can find fault—namely, the Ionian Sea, if one sail along shore; and the Sicilian, if one cross the open deep; and that while they enjoy their own possessions, they shall also settle their own quarrels; and that we tell the Segestans in particular, that since they went to war with the Selinuntines in the first instance without consulting the Athenians, they may also make peace with them by themselves; and that we do not in future make alliance, as we have been accustomed, with men whom we shall assist when they are unfortunate, and when we ask assistance ourselves, shall not obtain it.

And do you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to care for the state, and if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, put this to the vote, and take a second time the opinion of the Athenians; reflecting, if you feel afraid to move the question again, that the violation of the law would not, with so many abettors, involve any guilt; but that you would be acting as a physician to the state, when it had taken bad counsel; and that good government consists in this,—for a man to do his country as much good as possible, or, at least, to do it voluntarily no harm.

Delivered before the Assembly at Athena. Reported by Thucydides Translated by Henry Dale. One paragraph omitted. Read more!

An Appeal to Arms

Patrick Henry (May 29, 1736 – June 6, 1799)

As Patrick Henry had hurled the first defiance against Great Britain in 1765, he was the first to make an open appeal to arms in 1775. This was on March 23d, three weeks before the fight at Lexington precipitated the Revolution. Henry had returned from the Continental Congress and was now a member of the Virginia Convention, with Washington for one of his colleagues. Here he offered a resolution that the Colony should be "put into a state of defense," and sustained it by the most brilliant speech to which the Revolution gave rise.

Mr. President,
No man thinks more highly than I do of the patriotism, as well as abilities, of the very worthy gentlemen who have just addressed the House. But different men often see the same subject in different lights; and, therefore, I hope it will not be thought disrespectful to those gentlemen, if, entertaining as I do opinions of a character very opposite to theirs, I shall speak forth my sentiments freely and without reserve. 'This is no time for ceremony’. The question before the House is one of awful moment to this country. For my own part, I consider it as nothing less than a question of freedom or slavery and in proportion to the magnitude of the subject ought to be the freedom of the debate. It is only in this way that we can hope to arrive at the truth, and fulfill the great responsibility which we hold to God and our country. Should I keep back my opinions at such a time, through fear of giving offence, I should consider myself an guilty of treason towards my country, and of an act of disloyalty toward the Majesty of Heaven which I revere above all earthly kings.

Mr. President, it is natural for man to indulge in the illusions of hope. We are apt to shut our eyes against a painful truth, and listen to the song, till she transforms us into beasts. Is this the part of wise men, engaged in a great and arduous struggle for liberty? Are we disposed to be of the number of those, who, having eyes, see not, and having ears, hear not, the things which so nearly concern their temporal salvation? For my part, whatever anguish of spirit it may cost, I am willing to know the whole truth; to know the worst, and to provide for it. I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided; and that is the lamp of experience. I know of no way of judging of the future but by the past. And judging by the past, I wish to know what there has been in the conduct of the British ministry for the last ten years to justify those hopes with which gentlemen have been pleased to solace themselves and the House? Is it that insidious smile with which our petition has been lately received? Trust it not, sir; it will prove a snare to your feet. Suffer not yourselves to be betrayed with a kiss. Ask yourselves how this gracious reception of our petition comports with those warlike preparations which cover our waters and darken our land. Are fleets and armies necessary to a work of love and reconciliation? Have we shown ourselves unwilling to be reconciled that force must be called in to win back our love? Let us not deceive ourselves, sir. These are the implements of war and subjugation; the last arguments to which kings resort. I ask gentlemen, what means this martial array, if its purpose be not to force us to submission? Can gentlemen assign any other possibility? Has Great Britain any enemy, in this quarter of the world, to call for all this accumulation of navies and armies? No, sir, she has none. They are meant for us: they can be meant for no other. They are sent over to bind and rivet to us those chains which the British ministry have been so long forging. And what have we to oppose to them? Shall we try argument? Sir, we have been trying that for the last ten years. Have we anything new to offer upon the subject? Nothing. We have held the subject up in every light of which it is capable; but it has been all in vain. Shall we resort to entreaty and humble supplication? What terms shall we find which have not been already exhausted? Let us not, I beseech you, sir, deceive ourselves longer. Sir, we have done everything that could be done, to avert the storm which is now coming on. We have petitioned: we have remonstrated; we have supplicated; we have prostrated ourselves before the throne, and have implored its interposition to arrest the tyrannical hands of the ministry and Parliament. Our petitions have been slighted; our remonstrances have produced additional violence and insult; our supplications have been disregarded; and we have been spurned, with contempt, from the foot of the throne! In vain, after these things, may we indulge the fond hope of peace and reconciliation. There is no longer any room for hope. If we wish to be free, if we mean to preserve inviolate those inestimable privileges for which we’ve been so long contending if we mean not basely to abandon the noble struggle in which we have been so long engaged, and which we have pledged ourselves never to abandon, until the glorious object of our contest shall be obtained we must fight! I repeat it, sir, we must fight! An appeal to arms and to the God of Hosts is all that is left us!

They tell us that we are weak; unable to cope with so formidable an adversary. But when shall we be stronger? Will it be the next week, or the next year? Will it be when we are totally disarmed, and when a British guard shall be stationed in every house? Shall we gather strength by irresolution and inaction? Shall we acquire the means of effectual resistance by lying supinely on our backs, and hugging the delusive phantom of hope until our enemies shall have bound us hand and foot? Sir, we are not weak, if we make the proper use of those means which the God of Nature hath placed in our power. Three millions of people, armed in the holy cause of liberty, and in such a country as that which we possess, are invincible by any force which our enemy can send against us. Besides, Sir, we shall not fight our battles alone. There is a just God who presides over the destinies of nations, and who will raise up friends to fight our battles for us. The battle, Sir, is not to the strong alone; it is to the vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, Sir, we have no election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now too late to retire from the contest. There is no retreat, but in submission and slavery! Our chains are forged! Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston! The war is inevitable and let it come! I repeat it, sir, let it come!

It is in vain, sir, to extenuate the matter. Gentlemen may Peace, peace but there is no peace. The war is actually begun! The next gale that sweeps from the north, will bring to our ears the clash of resounding arms! Our brethren are already in the field! Why stand we here idle? What is it that gentlemen wish? What would they have? Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty, or give me death!

Quoted from The World’s Great Orators and Their Orations, 1917, by Charles Morris. Read more!

The Effect of Oratory

I wanted to outline for you, my readers, the merits of reading a speech and I find the words of someone in the past stimulating on the subject.

An oration, to be fully appreciated, must be heard, not read. Much of what gave it force and effect is lost when it is committed to print. The living personality is gone the flashing eye, the vibrating voice, the impetuous gesture, the passionate declamation, the swaying and sweeping energy of eloquence which at times gives to meaningless words a controlling force. Much is lost, but by no means all. The real flesh and blood of the oration is left its logic, its truth, its quality as a product of the intellect. When thus read, apart from the personal influence of the orator and with cool and judicial mind, the sophistry, the emptiness, of many showy orations become pitifully evident, while the true merit of the really great effort grows doubly apparent. No longer taken captive by the speaker's manner and the external aids to eloquence, the reader can calmly measure and weigh his words and thoughts, with competence to reject the vapid example of speech-making and give it’s just pre-eminence to the truly great oration.

From what is above said it should be evident that the powers of the orator are not alone those of pure reasoning, of logic reduced to its finest elements. No example of oratory should be judged from such a point of view. An orator is essentially a partisan. He takes sides almost necessarily, and is apt to employ any means at his command to give the supremacy to his own side of the question at issue. He is the counterpart, not of the judge who calmly and logically weighs the two sides of the case to be decided and seeks to avoid preference to either but of the advocate, whose aim it is to convince the jury that his own side is the correct one, and who does this by employing every sophistry, every trick of speech and argument, every device to add to the strength of his client's case and lessen that of his opponent. But ordinarily the orator, partisan though he may be, has a wider audience than a jury, and a higher sense of duty to himself and his hearers than is usually to be found in a jury trial. Though it may be his purpose rather to convince than to prove, and though he may not hesitate to help his side of the argument by oratorical devices and skillful deceptions, he must have an earnest belief in the strength and cogency of his own cause or he can scarcely hope to succeed. No man can serve God and Mammon. The great oration must come from the heart and not from the lips. Yet it is not enough for a man to believe in his cause; his cause as well as his belief must be strong. The speech which does not ring true to a judicious reader is defective either in its cause or its advocate. Sophistry may weigh well on the platform, but it becomes hollow and empty in the cabinet, and the merit of no oration can be justly decided upon until it has been put to the test of the reader's mind.

While, therefore, the idea is widely entertained that an oration must be heard to be truly appreciated, this conception is far from correct. There are two things to be considered in judging every oration; the real quality and merit of the thought expressed, and the effect of delivery the speaker's powers of elocution and the magnetic influence of voice and personality. The latter has often an immense effect, and the hearer frequently leaves the presence of the orator convinced against the decision of his own intellect, taken captive by the personal powers of the speaker. To learn what the oration really contains and what force it has as a pure expression of human thought, it must be read and weighed by the mind of the auditor when in a cool and critical state. Under such conditions the verdict is often changed and the weakness and emptiness of what may have seemed irrefutable arguments are exposed.

For this reason it may be held that no one should decide as to the true merit of an oration until he has read it, and the really great orations can be enjoyed by the reader centuries even after they were delivered.

Quoted from The World’s Great Orators and Their Orations, 1917, by Charles Morris. Read more!

On the Union of Sicily Against Invaders

Hermocrates (460–407 B.C.)

(416 B.C.)

Born in 460 B.C., died in 407; promoted the union of the Sicilian cities which made possible the defeat of Athens in 413; and in 412 went to Asia Minor, where he was successful for a time, but then lost a battle, was removed from command and sent into exile; fought against Carthage; died while attempting to reinstate himself in Syracuse.



IT is not because I am of a city that is either the least powerful, or the most distressed by hostilities that I shall address you, Sicilians, but in order publicly to state what appears to me the best policy for the whole of Sicily. And now with regard to war, to prove that it is a disastrous thing, why need one particularize all the evil involved in it, and so make a long speech before those who are acquainted with it? For no one is either driven to engage in it through ignorance, or deterred from it by fear, should he think that he will gain any advantage; but it is the lot of the former to imagine the gains greater than the dangers; and the latter will face the perils rather than put up with any present loss. But if both should happen to be thus acting unseasonably, exhortations to peace would be useful. And this would be most serviceable to us too at the present time, if we did but believe it. For it was surely with a purpose of well securing our own several interests that we both went to war at first, and are endeavoring by means of conference to come to terms again with each other; and if each one should not succeed in going away with what is fair, we shall proceed to hostilities again.

We should be convinced, however, that it is not for our own separate interests alone, if we are wise, that this congress will be held; but to consider whether we shall be able any longer to save the whole of Sicily, which, as I conceive, is the object of the machinations of the Athenians. And we should regard that people as much more compulsory mediators in such case than my words; who, possessing as they do the greatest power of all the Greeks, are watching our blunders, being here with a few ships; and under the legitimate name of alliance are speciously bringing to a profitable conclusion their natural hostility to us. For if we go to war, and call them in to our aid, men who of their own accord turn their arms even upon such as do not call them in; and if we injure ourselves by means of our own resources, and at the same time pave the way for their dominion; it is probable that when they observe us worn out, they will come hereafter with a great force, and endeavor to bring all these states into subjection to them.

And yet we ought, if we are wise, to aim at acquiring for our own respective countries what does not belong to them, rather than at diminishing what they already have, both in calling in allies and incurring fresh dangers; and to consider that faction is most ruinous to states, and particularly to Sicily, the inhabitants of which are all being plotted against, while we are at variance city with city. Knowing this then, we ought to make peace, individual with individual, and state with state, and to make a common effort to save the whole of Sicily; and the thought should be entertained by no one, that tho the Dorian part of us are enemies of the Athenians, the Chalcidian race is secured by its Ionian connection. For they are not attacking our nations, because they are different, and from their hatred of one of them; but from coveting the good things of Sicily, which we possess in common. And this they have now shown upon the invitation of the Chalcidian race; for to those who had never yet assisted them on the ground of their alliance, they themselves with forwardness answered their claim, beyond the letter of the compact.

With regard to the Athenians then, so great is found to be the benefit of our taking good advice. And with regard to peace, which is acknowledged by all to be a most excellent thing, how can it fail to be incumbent on us to conclude it among ourselves? Or do you think, that whatever good thing, or the contrary, anyone has, quiet would not more effectually than war put a stop to the. Latter, and help to preserve the former; and that peace has not the less hazardous honors and splendors? With all other topics which one might discuss in many words, on such a subject as war. Considering then these things, you ought not to disregard what I say, but should rather provide each for your own safety in compliance with it. And if any one think that he shall certainly gain some advantage, either by right or might, let him not be annoyed by failure through the unexpected result; knowing that many men ere now, both while pursuing with vengeance those who have wronged them, and hoping, in other instances, to win an advantage by greater power, in the one case, so far from avenging themselves, have not even saved themselves; and in the other, instead of gaining more, have happened also to lose what they had. For vengeance is not necessarily successful, because a man is injured; nor is strength sure, because it is sanguine. But the incalculable nature of the future prevails to the greatest possible degree; and tho the most deceptive of all things, still proves the most useful; for because we are equally afraid, we are more cautious in attacking one another.

And now, on account of our indefinite fear of this unknown future, and our immediate dread of the Athenians’ presence, being alarmed on both these grounds, and thinking, with regard to any failure in our ideas of what we severally thought to achieve, that these obstacles are a sufficient bar to their fulfillment, let us send away from the country the enemy that is among us, and ourselves make peace forever, if possible; but if not that, let us make a treaty for the longest term we can, and put off our private differences to a future period. In a word, let us be convinced that by following my advice we shall each have a free city, from which we shall, as our own masters, make an equally good return to him who treats us either well or ill; but if, through not following it, we are subject to others, then, not speak of avenging ourselves on any one, we necessarily become, even if most fortunate, friends to our greatest enemies, and at variance with those with whom we ought not to be so.

And for myself, although, as I said at the beginning of my speech, I represent a most powerful city, and am more likely to attack another than to defend myself, yet I think it right to provide against these things, and to make concessions; and not so to injure my enemies as to incur greater damage myself; nor through a foolish animosity to think that I have absolute sway alike over my own plans and over fortune, which I can not control; but to give way, as far as is reasonable. And I call on you all, of your own free will, to act in the same manner as myself, and not to be compelled to do it by your enemies. For there is no disgrace in connections giving way to connections, whether a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to those of the same race; in a word, all of us who are neighbors, and live together in one country, and that an island, and are called by the one name of Sicilians. For we shall go to war again, I suppose, when it may so happen, and come to terms again among ourselves by means of general conferences; but to foreign invaders we shall always, if we are wise, offer united resistance, inasmuch as by our separate losses we are collectively endangered; and we shall never in future call in any allies or mediators. For by acting thus we shall at the present time avoid depriving Sicily of two blessings—riddance both of the Athenians and of civil war—and shall in future enjoy it by ourselves in freedom, and less exposed to the machinations of others.

Delivered in Syracuse before the Assembly. Reported by Thucydides. Translated by Henry Dale. Read more!